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I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota legislature, in its 1971 regular session, en-
acted a bill that allows parents of children attending nonpublic
elementary and secondary schools during the tax year to credit
a portion of these educational costs against their state income
tax.1- "Education costs" include tuition, classroom instructional
fees and textbooks used in teaching those subjects taught in pub-
lic schools.2 Specifically excluded are the costs of textbooks used
in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship.3
Since the passage of the bill, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled on the issue of governmental aid to church re-
lated education in two cases. In Lemon v. Kurtzman' the Court
ruled two statutes unconstitutional under the establishment
clause of the First Amendment: 1 a Pennsylvania statute0 grant-
ing financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools through reimbursement for teachers' salaries, textbooks
and instructional materials in specific secular courses; and a
Rhode Island statute7 authorizing payment to nonpublic elemen-
tary school instructors of a supplement equal to 15 per cent of
their annual salary. On the same day in Tilton v. Richardson8
1. Misx. STAT. §§ 290.086, 290.087 (1971).
2. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(2) (1971).
3. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(4) (1971).
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof ... ." The establishment clause was held
to be applicable to "the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The free exercise
clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Constitutional issues of this sort will
arise regarding the Minnesota tax credit plan due to the inclusion of
sectarian schools among the classes of elementary and secondary insti-
tutions covered by MXNN. STAT. § 290.086 (3) (1971). Minnesota Civil Lib-
erties Union v. State of Minnesota, no. 379526 (Second Judicial DisL,
Minn., Aug. 24, 1971), is a recently initiated suit involving such a
challenge.
6. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (1968).
7. R.L GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
8. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). One aspect of the federal aid which the
majority held unconstitutional was the provision for termination of the
recipient's obligation not to use the facility for sectarian instruction af-
ter a 20 year period. Id. at 682-83.
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the Court found certain provisions of the Higher Education Fa-
cilities Act,9 permitting federal construction grants for the build-
ing of nonpublic college and university facilities, to be free from
constitutional defects.
This note will analyze these and prior Supreme Court deci-
sions to ascertain the directions the Court is presently taking in
interpreting the establishment clause, and to determine the con-
stitutionality of the Minnesota tax credit plan. The plan's va-
lidity under the relevant Minnesota constitutional provisions
will also be considered.
II. THE TAX CREDIT PROVISrONS
A. SCOPE
In providing a personal income tax credit for parents who
send their children to a nonpublic school, the Minnesota legisla-
ture defined such an educational institution as an elementary or
secondary school other than a public school which is located in
Minnesota, which complies with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which is not operated for profit and which fulfills the require-
ments of the state's compulsory attendance laws.1 0
Although the amount of the credit is based upon the par-
ents' actual educational expenditures," two limitations often
will reduce the amount allowed as a permissible credit. First,
the maximum amount of credit per pupil unit 2 is not to exceed
$100 during 1971 and 1972.13 Thereafter it may be increased by
the same percentage that state aid to public schools is increased,
provided that the amount of the credit does not exceed the actual
cost to the parents of sending a child to a nonpublic school. 14
This provision ensures that changes in the cost of educating chil-
dren in public schools will be reflected in the tax credit allowed
parochial school parents. Second, the ratio of the tax credit to
the individual nonpublic school "restricted maintenance cost" per
9. 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-58 (1963).
10. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(3) (1971).
11. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(5) (1971).
12. Under MINN. STAT. § 290.086(5) (1971) the words "per pupil unit
in average daily attendance" are intended to include any alternative
measure which may be designated by law to calculate state foundation
aid for public schools. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(1) (1971) contemplates
that pupil units are to be counted in the manner provided by MINN.
STAT. § 124.17 (1969), apparently denying use of the changes established
during the 1971 regular session under chapter 829.
13. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(5) (1971).
14. Id.
[Vol. 56:189
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL TAX CREDIT
pupil unit cannot exceed the ratio of the average state founda-
tion aid per pupil unit for public schools to the average state
and local maintenance cost per pupil unit.'8 The "restricted
maintenance cost" in nonpublic schools is the ordinary mainte-
nance cost under Mnnm. STAT. § 124.211 (2) (5) less 20 per cent.10
The purpose of this limitation is to equate the benefits received
by parochial school parents from the tax credit with the ad-
vantages derived by public school parents when the state pro-
vides for some of the educational costs of each student.
B. MEcHANIcs
A taxpayer who files for the tax credit cannot also claim a
deduction for tuition or costs of transportation of any dependent
under other applicable provisions. 17 Also, if the amount of the
credit surpasses any tax which would otherwise be due, such
surplus is paid to the claimant as a refund. 8 The tax-payer must
substantiate his claim by providing the Department of Taxation
with receipts and certificates from an official of the nonpublic
school,19 and penalties are imposed for any fraudulent or exces-
sive claims.20
IH. VALIDITY UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
Despite Chief Justice Burger's frank admission that "[c]an-
dor compels acknowledgment ... that we can only dimly per-
ceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive
area of constitutional law,"2' 1 certain criteria have been devel-
oped under which the constitutionality of church-state statutes
may be tested. The difficulty is not in identifying these guide-
lines, but in their application, as the law continually struggles to
reconcile the prohibitions against any establishment of religion
with the individual's right to the free exercise of his faith.
The absolute terms in which the two religion clauses are
drafted inevitably lead to conflict if either is carried to its logical
extreme.22 However, the clauses should be approached by look-
15. Id.
16. M1 w. STAT. § 290.086(1) (1971).
17. Mumx. STAT. § 290.087(1) (1971), covering the deductions pro-
vided for in MN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1969).
18. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(6) (1971).
19. Mxnx. STAT. § 290.087(7) (1971).
20. MiNN. STAT. § 290.087(4) (5) (1971).
21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
22. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
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ing to the objective they are meant to serve, not by construing
literally the words themselves. 23 As stated in Everson v. Board
of Education,2 4 accommodation of these two provisions
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state
to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor them.25
Furthermore, this necessary and desirable neutrality can be
breached by even "minor encroachments. '26  Such neutrality is
to be fulfilled, not by treating all religious institutions equally in
the granting of aid, but by an abstention from "fusing functions
of Government and of religious sects. ' 27 This approach recog-
nizes the doctrine of voluntarism: the belief that ideological
and religious concepts are to be accepted only on their own merit,
unaided by any external coercion or persuasion.
Total separation is impossible to attain 2 8 yet it remains the
goal. Reformulation of methods to reach that goal must continue
as the definitions of the word "religion" and the concept of ap-
propriate state action take on new contours over time.29 How-
ever, since total separation is impossible, all failures to reach that
goal are not unconstitutional. There is a permissible allowance
for a slight "deviation from an absolutely straight course,'
which allows for "play in the joints"' 1 in a manner which tends to
make court decisions unpredictable, but adds an element of prac-
ticality to the First Amendment. This is particularly relevant in
the field of education, where the governmental approach to ful-
filling the need for better education has made noninvolvement
with religion impossible.32
A. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
As noted in Engel v. Vitale,33 the establishment clause is
23. Id. at 668.
24. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
25. Id. at 18. See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 215-17 (1963).
26. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
27. McCollum v. Board of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (separate
opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952).
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
29. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1382 (1967).
30. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (dissenting opinion
of Harlan, J.).
31. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
32. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, 81 HAuv. L. REv. 513 (1968).
33. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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based on the realization that any union of government and reli-
gion "tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." 3'
The evils against which this clause was intended to protect are
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity."35 Three tests have been enun-
ciated in pursuit of these objectives. 30 First, an enactment must
have a secular legislative purpose. Second, its primary effect
must be neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion.
Finally, the end result must not be an excessive governmental
entanglement with religion.
1. Secular Purpose
In Abington School District v. Schempp,37 where the first
two tests were enunciated, the Court's attempt to assure the
"wholesome neutrality" required by the religion clauses lead to
the expression of the following criteria:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enact-
ment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circum-
scribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the establishment clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.38
Difficulty in the application of this first test is not limited to the
problem of determining what constitutes a "secular" purpose.
Questions may also arise as to the proper means of determining a
legislative purpose and, where multiple purposes are apparent, as
to the relative weight needed for the state's particular secular
purpose to prevail.
Examination of legislative motives has long been considered
an inadequate approach.39 It has been suggested that courts will
tend to avoid any such analysis where secular purposes can be
gleaned from statutory declarations and legislative history.4 0
However, the secular purpose test, if it is to serve an independent
role apart from the primary effect test, must require more than
a glance at a statutory preamble. It is difficult to imagine a leg-
34. Id. at 431.
35. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
36. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
37. 374U.S. 203 (1963).
38. Id. at 222.
39. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 277-79 (1968).
40. Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-New Directions
Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. REv. 579, 596-97 (1969).
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islature so lacking in ingenuity that it cannot find at least one
secular purpose to offer as justification for its enactment.,'
The approach taken by the Supreme Court has been to "ac-
cord appropriate deference" to the legislature's stated intent un-
less contradictory facts can be shown. 42 In Board of Education
v. Allen,4 3 where the New York statutory allowance for textbook
loans was held not to be in violation of the First Amendment,
Justice White noted that "[a] ppellants have shown us nothing
about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its
stated purpose."'4 4  A similar approach was used in Schempp,
where factors such as required reading from the Bible, the op-
tional use of the Catholic Douay version and allowance for non-
attendance were held inconsistent with the stated purpose of
promoting morals and teaching literature.' 5
The relative importance of the particular secular purpose
necessary to label the enactment as essentially nonreligious has
received little attention by the Court. Although the view has
been expressed that the secular purpose must be paramount,"'
it seems something less should suffice. Professor Choper argues
that the secular purpose need not be paramount if there exists a
legitimate independent secular purpose.4 7 The value of this idea
is that it gives greater deference to the findings and conclusions
of the legislative body in a matter that is really a legislative task,
namely identifying and implementing methods to solve the state's
allocation and welfare problems. It also reduces the subjective
balancing test that would otherwise result. At the same time the
primary effect test, the excessive entanglement test, and the
Court's tendency to search for facts contradicting the stated pur-
pose temper the possible dangers of a concept such as Choper's.
41. LaNoue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Trans-
portation and Medical Care, 13 J. PUB. L. 76, 77-78 (1964). One suggested
cure for this is to search for assurance that the means employed by the
government do not destroy the meaningfulness of the proposed secular
ends. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM, 178-80 (1967); Hammett,
The Homogenized Wall, 53 A.B.A.J. 929, 932 (1967). As stated by Justice
Brennen in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 265
(1963), "[T]he teaching of both Torcaso and the Sunday Law Cases is
that government may not employ religious means to serve secular in-
terests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest
demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice."
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
43. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
44. Id. at 243.
45. 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963).
46. Hammett, supra note 41, at 932.
47. Choper, supra note 39, at 280.
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The result is that the statute's constitutionality will turn upon
conclusions derived from more meaningful and concrete inquir-
ies.
2. Primary Effect
Even if the purpose of the governmental action is compatible
with the establishment clause, its primary effect must not be the
advancement or inhibition of religion. Such a generalized test,
however, immediately raises a vast number of questions, many of
which the Court has not answered. Perhaps this is because
"primary effect" is not to be fixed by definition but is simply to
serve as the "end product of a complex empirical judgment."48
While the Court in Everson v. Board of Education stated that
"[n]either [a state nor the federal government] can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another, ' 49 such a strict "no aid" approach has not been fol-
lowed.50 This fact has engendered debate among commentators
as to the meaning of "primary." For example, one commentator
thought it must mean "first-order, fundamental effect" in order
to be consistent with past decisions.5 1 Another suggested a rela-
tive measurement in which the church may not receive a greater
share of the benefits than the state.512  Choper, on the other
hand, would consider as "primary" any independent secular ef-
fect, regardless of possible additional religious effects. 53 This
definitional problem recently may have been resolved. Chief
Justice Burger spoke of the "principal or primary effect"
throughout his opinions in both Lemon5 4 and Tilton,55 treating
48. Valente, supra note 40, at 595.
49. 330 U.S. at 15.
50. As recently as Tilton, the Court stated that "[T]he crucial ques-
tion is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a
consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or
primary effect advances religion." 403 U.S. at 679.
51. Giannella, supra note 32, at 533.
52. Hammett, supra note 41, at 933.
53. Choper, supra note 39, at 277-79, 287-90.
54. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). In Tilton v. Richardson the opinion of
the Court was written by Chief Justice Burger with Justices Blackmun,
Harlan and Stewart joining. The concurring opinion of Justice White
provided the majority needed to uphold the federal program. Dissents
were filed by Justice Brennan and by Justice Douglas with Justices
Black and Marshall joining. Chief Justice Burger also wrote the opin-
ion of the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, again joined by Justices Black-
mun, Harlan and Stewart. The concurring and dissenting opinions must
be separated in terms of the Rhode Island case and the Pennsylvania
case. Justice Douglas concurred in both cases in Lemon and was joined
by Justices Black and Marshall, but the latter only as to the Rhode Is-
land case since he took no part in the consideration or decision of the
1971]
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the word "principal" as synonomous with "primary." It appears
then that some impact on religion will not violate the primary
effect test.5 6
Yet to define "primary effect" is not to assure ease in its ap-
plication. One approach indirectly mentioned by the Court in
applying this test has been the child benefit theory. The doc-
trine generally provides that the state may validly extend as-
sistance to the child or his parent, though public aid to parochial
schools themselves would be unconstitutional. Everson was the
first significant Supreme Court decision to advance this con-
cept.57 While not adopting the child benefit theory in the precise
form in which it was developed by earlier state court decisions,
the majority viewed this program as simply an instance where
children receive the benefits of public welfare legislation, re-
gardless of the fact of their attendance at church-related schools.
The Court emphasized that "[t] he State contributes no money
to the schools."58 In Allen the Court came closer to the state
court formulation of the child benefit concept, stating "no funds
or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial
benefit is to parents and children, not to schools." 59 And most
recently Chief Justice Burger used this rationale in Lemon to
find the Pennsylvania plan more clearly defective than that of
Pennsylvania case. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion and
would have reversed outright the judgment in the Pennsylvania case.
Justice White filed a concurring opinion as to the Pennsylvania case and
a dissenting opinion in the Rhode Island cases. Hereinafter, references
in the text to statements of Chief Justice Burger in Tilton and Lemon
refer to the opinion of the Court, which he wrote.
55. 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971). It should be noted, however, that the
Court has warned against reliance on words which may be broad in na-
ture and later used inconsistently in specific applications. Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
56. This is not necessarily a relaxation on permissible aid since a
program which has substantial, but less than "principal," effects may
fail nevertheless under the establishment clause as constituting excessive
governmental entanglement. See text accompanying notes 74-104 in-fra.
57. Actually, Chief Justice Hughes, in Cochran v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Ed., 381 U.S. 370 (1930), initially recognized the significance
of the identity of the recipient of the aid. However, the taxpayer's
challenge to the expenditure of public funds used in purchasing text-
books for all students in the state was not based upon the establishment
clause, the First Amendment not having been incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment at that time, but rather on a theory of taking of pri-
vate property for a private purpose in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
58. 330 U.S. at 18.
59. 392 U.S. at 243-44.
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Rhode Island in that in the former the aid passed directly to the
nonpublic school.60
Obviously the child benefit theory, to have any practical use-
fulness, must be applied mechanically since any other form of
implementation realizes no limitations. For example, certainly
most money given to church related schools for improvements
will be reflected in benefits to the child."1 Yet such a mechani-
cal test is clearly subject to criticism as placing form over sub-
stance.62 In cases in which the criticism is valid, the child bene-
fit theory probably should not be used, but the criticism is not
necessarily valid in all instances. Surely situations could arise
where state control over assistance is significantly enhanced by
channeling the benefits directly to the student.6 3 Such an ar-
rangement would reduce the possibility of the program being
manipulated to serve religious ends and decrease the need for sur-
veillance to implement the particular state plan, thereby mini-
mizing direct contact between church and state.6 4
This justification for the child benefit theory is related to
the proposition that the real issue to be faced is the nature of the
aid, not the conduit through which it passes05 Clearly, assist-
ance which could be used for strictly religious purposes should
not be upheld simply because of the identity of the recipient.
The Court has apparently recognized this even though the issue
has not been directly before them. In Allen the majority de-
voted a great deal of time to identifying the secular aspects of the
aid after a short discussion of the identity of the recipient.66
Also, though the Court did mention that the textbooks involved
were loaned at the request of the pupil, and that ownership re-
mained at least technically in the state,67 thereby benefiting only
pupils, the significance of this fact is slight since private schools
previously had never contributed such books. In Walz v. Tax
Commission68 this element apparently was deemed not control-
60. 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971).
61. L. PrFxE, supra note 41, at 568.
62. E.g., Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAmv. L. Rrv.
1680, 1682 (1969).
63. Giannella, supra note 32, at 577.
64. As to the dangers of direct church-state contact, see text ac-
companying notes 74-104 infra.
65. Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
41 IND. L.J. 302, 308-09 (1965).
66. Valente, supra note 40, at 593; Comment, Constitutional Law-
Aid to Parochial and Private Schools, 15 V.L. L. REV. 477, 483 (1970).
67. 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
68. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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ling since the textbook provision was viewed as "surely an 'aid'
to the sponsoring churches because it relieved those churches of
an enormous aggregate cost for those books."' 0 Likewise, the
Court found the Rhode Island teacher supplement plan in Lemon
unconstitutional, while the federal grants at issue in Tilton,
which were given directly to the private colleges, were held to
be valid.
When emphasis is shifted in this way to the nature of the aid,
the easiest type of program to sustain is that which can be lab-
elled as "public welfare legislation." These benefits or services,
which do not directly involve the educational process, can be
said to be "indisputably marked off from the religious func-
tion,17 0 and such general assistance should not be denied to citi-
zens simply because of their religious faith. Yet the variability
of the social services provided militates against using this ap-
proach as justification for many of the more difficult programs.
As was stated by Chief Justice Burger when considering the
"good works" performed by churches:
To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious
bodies would introduce an element of governmental evaluation
and standards as to the worth of particular social welfare pro-
grams, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relation-
ship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize. 71
Aid more directly related to the church school's educational
process has not invariably been declared unconstitutional. For
example, in Allen the Court upheld a New York law which re-
quired school boards to loan, without charge, textbooks to stu-
dents at both private and public schools. 72 However, this surely
is not a blanket acceptance of state plans which make allowances
for books and other instructional materials; and since Allen in-
volved a motion for summary judgment it raises the possibility
that an attack on the Minnesota tax credit scheme, even as it
relates to textbooks, will not necessarily be upheld. In Allen
there was also no evidence of the methods of teaching the ma-
terial in the books, nor was there evidence of the atmosphere sur-
rounding the use of the materials. A program of aid for teacher's
salaries should be distinguished from Allen because the appar-
ently neutral or nonideological nature of these benefits is much
more suspect due to the control exercised over the instructors by
69. Id. at 671-72. See also Duval, The Constitutionality of State
Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 1970 U. oF ILL.
LAW FORUM, 342, 346.
70. Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
71. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
72. Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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the church hierarchy, the religious affiliations of such teachers
with the accompanying potential tendency to advance their faith,
and the unascertainable nature of the techniques employed in
their daily teaching duties.73 Thus, even though the rule in Al-
Zen is limited, the conclusion that benefits directed to the edu-
cational system itself are unconstitutional is misleading with-
out specific reference to the particulars of the programs in ques-
tion.
3. Excessive Entanglement
In Walz v. Tax Commission7 4 a New York Constitutional pro-
vision 75 authorizing exemptions from taxation for real property
used exclusively for religious educational or charitable purposes
and owned by nonprofit associations for such purposes was up-
held against an attack based primarily on the establishment
clause. That decision, however, actually restricted the permissi-
ble scope of governmental involvement with religious institu-
tions78 by prescribing yet another establishment clause test:
whether or not the statute could result in an "excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion."7 7
In Lemon Chief Justice Burger found excessive govern-
ment entanglement after examining the institutions benefitted,
the nature of the state aid and the resulting relationship between
the government and religious authority.7" A slightly different
approach was taken by Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp,
where he noted that the types of involvement the drafters of
the Constitution meant to avoid were those which (a) serve
essentially religious activities of religious institutions, (b) em-
ploy the organs of government for religious purposes, or (c) use
religious means where secular means would suffice. 9 In effect
then, acceptable involvement has been measured by both a quali-
tative and a quantitiative yardstick.
The quantitative aspect of excessive entanglement requires
an inquiry into whether there are "sustained and detailed ad-
ministrative relationships"8 0 or whether the involvement calls
73. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-20 (1971).
74. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
75. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 16, § 1.
76. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
77. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
78. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
79. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963)
(concurring opinion).
80. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
1971]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
for "official and continuing surveillance." One factor mentioned
by Chief Justice Burger in Tilton as diminishing the potential
danger of entanglement was the fact that the governmental aid
was a "one-time, single-purpose construction grant," without
continuing financial relationships or dependencies. 8 However,
the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, with whom Justices
Black and Marshall concurred, contained strong language mak-
ing it clear that the quantitative test is not totally accepted by
all members of the Court. Justice Douglas saw as "constitu-
tionally insiginificant" the fact that the money was not appro-
priated annually and suggested that small payments over a
number of years are just as violative of the First Amendment as
a large, lump-sum payment.8 2
In some instances the amount of surveillance deemed im-
permissible may be qualified by the type of surveillance required
under the particular program. Obviously not all types of con-
tact between government and church-related schools are con-
demned. As was noted by Justice White in a discussion of Pierce
v. Society of Sisters:83
[I]f the State must satisfy its interest in secular education
through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper inter-
est in the manner in which those schools perform their secular
educational function.84
Instead of a blanket prohibition the Court has condemned only
those relationships between church and state which allow the
state to decide what is secular or religious.8 5
When the establishment clause is applied to assistance pro-
grams involving parochial schools, the question of "permeation"
inevitably arises-the extent to which the sectarian permeates
and is inseparable from the secular. The permeation concept is
crucial to both the primary effect and entanglement tests, since
any aid to sectarian functions is prohibited while aid to secular
needs may be permissible. There has been a continuous debate
over whether a line of separation realistically can be drawn be-
tween secular and religious teachings. On the one hand, it is
suggested that parochial schools may fulfill the secular function
in the same manner as the public schools, with only a minor re-
81. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
82. Id. at 692-93 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.). However, the
language used by Justice Douglas apparently fails to separate primary
effect and entanglement issues.
83. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
84. Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968).
85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
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ligious accent.8 6 Contrariwise, it is forcefully advanced that the
Roman Catholic faith will not recognize any distinction between
secular and religious teachings, since it cannot visualize teaching
as a neutral activity.8 7 Both Pope Leo XIII8s and Pope Pius
XIs9 said "it is necessary not only that religious instruction be
given to the young at certain fixed times, but also that every
subject taught be permeated with Christian piety." As one com-
mentator has noted, "it is commonplace observance that in the
parochial school religion permeates the whole curriculum and is
not confined to a single half hour period of the day."90
Board of Education v. Allen9 ' was the first Supreme Court
decision to specifically face the permeation issue. The Court, in
response to the contention that there should be an irrebuttable
presumption that church schools necessarily integrate religion
into secular education, recognized the dual goals of religious
schools. The Court ruled that it could not find, solely on the
basis of judicial notice, that the state's provision of textbooks
was an involvement with religion which the First Amendment
would not permit.92 The Court, however, did not set forth the
kind of evidence of nonperformance of the secular function that
gives rise to a finding of the unconstitutional permeation.
In Lemon and Tilton the Supreme Court again addressed it-
self to the integration problem, but the ramifications of those de-
cisions are not completely clear. In the Rhode Island program in
Lemon 93 the district court's findings on the potential for exces-
sive entanglement were held sufficient to substantiate a violation
of the establishment clause. The district court found a close
proximity of church schools to the parishes, the use of religious
symbols, the availability of religiously oriented extracurricular
86. Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MxcH.
L. Rzv. 1, 36 (1961).
87. L. PFEFFEm, supra note 41, at 510-11.
88. Mifltantis Ecclesiar, Aug. 1, 1897.
89. Rappresentanti in Terra, Dec. 31, 1929.
90. J. FICHTM, PARocHAL SCHOOL: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 86 (1958).
This view was voiced by Justice Jackson in Everson: "Catholic educa-
tion is the rock on which the whole structure rests, and to render tax aid
to its church school is indistinguishable to me from rendering the same
aid to the Church itself." 330 U.S. at 24.
91. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
92. Id. at 245-48.
93. The complaint filed against the Pennsylvania plan in Lemon
alleged that church related elementary and secondary schools are con-
trolled by religious organizations whose function is to promote a reli-
gious faith and operate in a manner so as to fulfill that purpose. Hearing
the case as a motion to dismiss for not stating a claim for relief dictated
acceptance of the allegations as true. 403 U.S. at 620.
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activities and the employment of many teaching nuns." Al-
though the court found no specific incidents of religious values
infiltrating into secular courses,9 5 the likelihood of such an oc-
currence led the state legislature to enact the controls and sur-
veillances that violated the entanglement test. However, in Til-
ton Chief Justice Burger used what appears, at first glance, to be
a different approach. In response to the claim that religious in-
stitutions use every possible device to propagate a particular re-
ligion, the Chief Justice pointed to the district court findings to
emphasize that no evidence existed to warrant a holding that re-
ligion permeates the secular education, citing AllenY0 The rec-
ord in Tilton was found to differ significantly enough from
Lemon to warrant an opposite result on the entanglement issue.
Not only was there an absence of the specific dangers enumer-
ated in Lemon, but other factors tended to show a lesser empha-
sis on religion, which required fewer governmental controls to
prevent the infiltration of sectarian ideas into secular education.
Among these factors were (1) the fact that higher education was
involved, (2) the nonideological character of the aid, and (3) the
one-time, single-purpose relationship.9 7
One can sympathize with Justice White's opinion that such
reasoning is a "curious and mystifying blend."9 8 However, the
two opinions can be reconciled in such a way as to make inac-
curate Justice White's criticism in Lemon that Chief Justice Bur-
ger refused to accept express findings that none of the teachers
mixed religious and secular instruction.99 In Tilton, it is true
that the Chief Justice rejected an approach which looked to a
"typical institution," saying that no evidence had been presented
that justified a conclusion that secular education was intertwined
with religion in the particular institutions involved. But it
must be emphasized that here the Chief Justice was addressing
himself solely to the "primary effect" test, which may explain
this seemingly inconsistent approach. If the contention is that
the primary effect of the aid to certain school functions is an ad-
vancement of religion, evidence that religion is indeed a part of
secular instruction should be crucial. However, excessive en-
tanglement can be present even if evidence of permeation is not
94. Id. at 615-16.
95. Id. at 618-19.
96. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1971).
97. Id. at 685-89.
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 666 (1971) (White, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Id.
[Vol. 56:189
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL TAX CREDIT
available to show a specific effect of aid to religion, because the
government must employ substantial controls over certain activi-
ties in order to prevent religion from entering secular teaching.
Since governmental involvement should be related directly to
the degree of danger that religion will be aided, evidence relevant
to the entanglement issue is not necessarily that which shows a
mixture of secular and religious functions, but rather evidence of
many facts indicating the likelihood of such mixture. Thus the
Chief Justice did not reject either of the statutory programs in-
volved in Lemon or Tilton on the basis of the primary effect test,
since the findings in each negated any suggestion of inter-
mingling of secular and religious teachings. Rather Lemon and
Tilton were differentiated on the entanglement issue because the
evidence in Tilton showed a lesser need for government involve-
ment.
Also noticeable in the recent opinions, in their approach to
the entanglement issue, is the emphasis on facts leading to dan-
gers of involvement rather than the specific statutory procedures
to be implemented by the government. This development of
Walz is necessary to understand the statement of Justice White:
Thus, the potential for impermissible fostering of religion in se-
cular classrooms-an untested assumption of the Court-para-
doxically renders unacceptable the State's efforts at insuring
that secular teachers under religious discipline successfully avoid
conflicts between the religious mission of the school and the se-
cular purpose of the State's education program. 00
Evidence of specific instances of permeation in the teachings of
the secular subjects in nonpublic schools may be far more diffi-
cult to establish than evidence of specific examples where imple-
mentation of the aid will require substantial controls to prevent
the influx of religion into secular functions, thus highlighting the
fears of Justice White. But the implication of the recent Supreme
Court cases is that a state will not be allowed to increase the
chances that its statutory scheme will be declared constitutional
by not specifically providing for the necessary surveillance in the
statutes. The emphasis is on the reasonable steps required to
apply the statute, not the legislature's declarations on how the
program will be policed. As stated in Lemon:
[T]he potential for impermissible fostering of religion is pres-
ent. The Rhode Island Legislature has not, and could not, pro-
vide state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular
teachers under religious discipline can avoid conflicts. The State
must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized
100. Id. at 666-67.
1971]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
teachers do not inculcate religion-indeed the State has under-
taken to do so.101
As a result of the Lemon decision a different form of in-
volvement has stepped into the forefront as a further criterion
for compliance with the First Amendment. Assistance programs
which tend to divide public opinion concerning political actions
along religious lines lead to the very dangers the First Amend-
ment seeks to avoid. To allow legislative decisions to be analyzed
within a religious frame of reference is to destroy the wall that
has been built between church and state.10 2  This problem of
political divisiveness was first recognized by Justice Goldberg in
Schempp, when he said that the activities in question must not
involve the state so significantly and directly in the realm of the
sectarian as to give rise to those very divisive influences and
inhibitions of freedom which both religion clauses of the First
Amendment preclude.10 3
As Justice Harlan stated, what is at stake is prevention of in-
volvement that is likely to "lead to strife and frequently strain a
political system to the breaking point."1 0 4
B. FREE EXERCISE
In free exercise issues the Court has focused on the "coercive
effect of the enactment" on the individual's practice of religion'0 5
whereas such an inquiry has been found irrelevant to questions
involving the establishment clause. 0 0 Whether this difference
in approach avoids potential inconsistencies is open to question.
Despite the language of the free exercise clause it is clear
that it does not prohibit all governmental actions that have a co-
ercive effect on religious activity. In Reynolds v. United
States,0 7 in response to the claim of a Mormon that it is uncon-
stitutional not to exempt him from a polygamy statute because
of his religion, the Court held that "[1] aws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."'108 The
101. 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). Although Chief Justice Burger did not
state upon whom the burden would be placed in regard to this issue, it
is likely to be on he who challenges the legislation.
102. Id. at 622-25.
103. 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (concurring opinion of Goldberg, J.).
104. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (separate opinion of
Harlan, J.).
105. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
106. Id.
107. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
108. Id. at 166.
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fear was that to reach a contrary result "would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself."'10 9
While the Court has stood steadfast against direct govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs, 110 its approach to overt
practices has shifted from the simplistic rationale in Reynolds.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,"' the Court found that certain Sunday
closing laws, as applied to Orthodox Jewish merchants who
closed their businesses on Saturday in accordance with their re-
ligious faith, did not violate the free exercise clause. Rather
than following the Reynolds approach the majority adopted an
alternative means test:
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious ob-
servance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden. 11
The shift in reasoning was completed in Sherbert v. Verner. ' 13
Now such constitutional issues are to be decided by balancing
the religious liberties of the individual with the compelling in-
terests of government."14 The Court typically has rejected free
exercise claims where the regulated conduct posed a substantial
threat to public safety, peace and order.115 Yet the difficulty of
applying this standard to specific problems" makes it too vague
a criterion to be a helpful means of solving problems extending
into other related areas. The necessary element of individual
coercion, however, consistently has been lacking in cases where
those seeking to attack a program of financial aid to private
schools have attempted to use the free exercise clause. In Tilton
the free exercise argument arose out of the compulsion to pay
taxes from which part of the building grants were financed. Re-
109. Id. at 167.
110. Toraso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
111. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
112. Id. at 607. Indirectness was to mean that hardships would be
placed upon particular religious practices, but one would still be al-
lowed to realize these practices and yet comply with the law.
113. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
114. For examples of suggested factors to be applied in this balanc-
ing process see Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HAV.
L. Rzv. 327, 345 (1969); Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A So-
ciological Approach, 67 McE. L. RPv. 679 (1969); Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HAnv. I Rsv.
1381, 1390 (1967).
115. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
116. Giannella, supra note 114, at 1390-97.
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jection of this contention was based upon an analysis of the type
of compulsion at which the free exercise clause is directed: coer-
cion aimed at the practice of the taxpayer's particular religious
beliefs.1 17 This was simply a reiteration of the position taken in
Allen and Walz, and there is no reason to suggest that a change
will be forthcoming in later school aid cases.
The free exercise clause has also been utilized by supporters
of school aid legislation. The contention typically is that a free
exercise violation arises when students are denied benefits sim-
ply because of their religion. Such denial, it is further con-
tended, might even result in a decrease in the quality of educa-
tion such that parents are forced to change the schools to which
they send their children. Support for this argument is said to
arise from the Court's statements in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion that the state
cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own re-
ligion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-be-
lievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, be-
cause of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of
public welfare legislation.118
Despite this Supreme Court declaration, the lower courts subse-
quently have reached inconsistent results in response to argu-
ments that the free exercise clause supports school aid.""0 This
is due in part to the emphasis given language later in the Ever-
son case, namely that this remark was not "to intimate that a
state could not provide transportation only to children attending
public schools .... ,,12o The Ohio court, in Honohan v. Holt, in-
terpreted such statements to mean that there is no consti-
tutional requirement that benefits be provided to every student.
However, if that is the state's desire it is unconstitutional to limit
aid to only public school students and children in private, nonre-
ligious schools. 12 1 The West Virginia Supreme Court has been
less restrictive, merely stating that any denial to children at-
tending parochial schools of rights to bus transportation equal to
those accorded children in public schools "deprives Catholic chil-
dren and their parents of their right of religious freedom in vio-
117. 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971).
118. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
119. Compare Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970);
Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860 (Idaho 1971); State ex rel. Chambers
v. School Dist., 155 Mont. 422, 472 P.2d 1013 (1970); with Honohan v.
Holt, 17 Ohio Misc. 47, 244 N.E.2d 537 (1968); State ex rel. Hughes v.
Board of Ed., 174 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1970).
120. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
121. 170 Ohio Misc. 47, 69, 244 N.E.2d 537, 545 (1969).
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lation of the provisions of the First Amendment .... "122 In
Epeldi v. Engelking, the Idaho court found such reasoning to be
"a circuitous route to arrive at a predetermined goal" 12 3 By
their own choice the students were said to have denied them-
selves the right to enjoy any of the benefits given to public school
students. This was simply the price for exercising one's religious
beliefs.124
C. EVALUATION OF MINNESOTA PROVISIONS
These tests and other factors stressed by the United States
Supreme Court indicate the precarious position of the Minne-
sota tax credit plan. In evaluating the program's validity under
the First Amendment it is useful to keep in mind the arguments
typically advanced by the proponents of this type of plan: (1)
that the aid goes directly to the child or his parent, the school
benefitting incidentally at most, 12 5 and (2) that the government
is merely refraining from receiving tax money rather than giv-
ing actual support to religion.12 6
122. State ex rel. Hughes v. Board of Ed. 174 S.E.2d 711, 719 (W. Va.
1970).
123. 488 P.2d 860, 866 (Idaho 1971).
124. 488 P.2d at 866-67.
125. Freeman, Tax Credits and the School Aid Deadlock, 194 CAmH-
oLrc WoRLD 201, 207-08 (1962).
126. Proponents of the Minnesota tax credit plan will undoubtedly
seize upon the Walz decision for support of this second contention as to
the form of the aid. In finding no nexus between a tax exemption and
the establishment of religion, the majority in Walz viewed the New York
statute as "simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of
property taxation levied on private profit institutions." 397 U.S. at 673.
Sponsorship was absent because the "government does not transfer part
of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the
church support the state." Id. at 675. The weight which the Supreme
Court gave to these distinctions between the forms of aid provided will
be very important to the challenge of the Minnesota tax plan since the
myriad other factors upon which the Court in Walz arguably based its
decision are not present with the tax credit scheme. Absent are the two
hundred years of history which negate involvement in a political sense
or as the first step toward the establishment of religion. The Court ad-
mitted that this "is not something to be lightly cast aside." Id. at 678.
Also missing is the practical consideration in Walz that the alternative
to exemption is expansion of involvement by taxing the churches. Id.
at 674. Certainly by removing the tax credit the state's role results in
lesser involvement since it would merely entail the normal tax collec-
tion procedure. Absent also is "voluntary pluralism," deemed so essen-
tial by Justice Brennan when he stated in his concurring opinion that
"Government may properly include religious institutions among the va-
riety of private, nonpublic groups that receive tax exemptions, for each
group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enter-
prise essential to a vigorous pluralistic society." Id. at 689. See also Id.
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1. Secular Purpose
It would seem to have been in the interest of those support-
ing the Minnesota bill to have included a statement of its pur-
pose, especially in light of the great weight given such statutory
declarations. 127 Yet the omission is not critical. The state's le-
gitimate concern in maintaining minimum standards in accred-
ited schools and to improve society through better education of
our youth extends to private as well as public schools because of
the dual function church related schools are conceded to pro-
vide.128 Many of the statute's defenders do not emphasize these
reasons, focusing instead on the financial crisis facing parochial
schools. However, this adds nothing to its validity. The Court
is unlikely to consider economic conditions as significant in de-
termining constitutionality.' 29
2. Primary Effect
Whether the tax credit plan has the effect of advancing reli-
gion will depend, in part, upon the Court's acceptance of the child
benefit theory. That the plan concerns itself with providing tax
relief to the parents rather than paying subsidies to the school
will surely be argued as a principal basis for its validity. While
it has been advanced that the child benefit doctrine is not neces-
sarily the exaltation of form over substance in all instances,"30
it clearly is such an instance when implemented under the Min-
nesota tax plan. Whenever conditions are necessarily made a
part of the legislation in order to validly pursue the state's par-
ticular goals to the extent required under the Minnesota tax
at 693; 397 U.S. at 699 n.2 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.) The organiza-
tions associated with tax relief under the Minnesota plan are limited to
private, nonprofit schools only, and with church related schools consti-
tuting such a large proportion of this class the suggestion of preference
for religion becomes much more real and tends to overshadow conten-
tions of pluralism.
127. See text accompanying notes 37-45 supra.
128. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1971); Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-
47 (1968).
129. As Chief Justice Burger stated in Lemon:
[N]othing we have said can be construed to disparage the role
of church-related elementary and secondary schools in our na-
tional life .... Nor do we ignore their economic plight in a
period of rising costs and expanding need ....
The merits and benefits of these schools, however, are not
the issue before us in these cases. The sole question is whether
state aid can be squared with the dictates of the Religion Clauses.
403 U.S. at 625.
130. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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credit scheme, the likelihood of more direct relationships with re-
ligious institutions increases to the point of finding substantial
merit in the form-over-substance contention. The counter ra-
tionale which was argued to justify the child benefit theory is
overshadowed by the evils of such resulting relationships.
The nature of the aid provided, also considered an appropri-
ate concern,131 is justification for objection to the statute. Un-
der the New York textbook provision at issue in Allen, the books
which could be loaned free of charge were the ones designated
for use in the public schools or approved by the school boards.
The approach taken under the Minnesota statute is to look not
at the contents of the material but the courses in which they are
being used. "Textbooks" are defined to include materials "used
in nonpublic schools in teaching only those subjects legally and
commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools"
and not those used "in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines
or worship, the purpose of which is to inclucate such tenets, doc-
trines or worship."' 3 2  One of the principal reasons for distin-
guishing teachers from textbooks was that "a textbook's content
is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not"13 3
and "[u]nlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to
determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and
subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment. '13 4 When emphasis is placed on the type of course
taught rather than the pages in a text, certainly a more compre-
hensive and continuing governmental surveillance is necessary
and the dangers of a primary effect of aiding religion increase.
But these problems will arise under the Minnesota plan
since "education costs" includes not only textbooks and class-
room instructional fees but also tuition charges,13 5 such costs
surely, in part, used to pay teacher's salaries. In order not to
constitute aid to religion the salaries would have to be only for
the support of purely secular subjects. Yet Lemon would lead to
a finding of an unconstitutional degree of involvement were this
separation to be policed effectively. While the Court in Lemon
did consider such evidence as the Rhode Island "Handbook of
School Regulations,"' 3 6 it is improbable that any program aiding
131. See text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
132. MmNl. STAT. § 290.086(4) (1971).
133. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
134. Id. at 619.
135. MN . STAT. § 290.086(2) (1971).
136. 403 U.S. 602, 617-18 (1971).
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religious teachers will be sustained, particularly if they are
teaching in a school of their faith. 13 7
3. Excessive Entanglement
Impermissible entanglement of a political nature is a sub-
stantial obstacle to the validity of the tax credit. 1 8 Admittedly
it is not a simple task to differentiate legislative programs giving
rise to a division of opinion along religious lines from plans not
causing such division. But the fact that an objective measure-
ment of any church-state relationship cannot be made precisely
suggests that the proper approach might be to search further
for those specific circumstances which hold a high potential for
involvement. The Minnesota tax credit plan appears to be of
questionable validity when analyzed in light of such circum-
stances as stressed in Lemon.1 39 The innovative nature of the
137. To modify the nature of the aid by the form in which it is pro-
vided, here a tax credit, may not be sufficient to protect the Minnesota
statute from constitutional attack. Justice Brennan was able to justify
the distinction between the tax exemption at issue in Walz and the direct
subsidies by stating that:
[t]hough both provide economic assistance, they do so in funda-
mentally different ways. A subsidy involves the direct transfer
of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and uses re-
sources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on
the other hand, involves no such transfer.
397 U.S. at 690. However, these generalizations are inadequate as
guidelines when one seeks to compare the Minnesota tax credit with ei-
ther tax exemptions or direct subsidies. Obviously a tax credit is similar
to an exemption in that there is a mere abstention from tax collection
(although even this is not so when a tax refund results). However, to
claim that this factor automatically guarantees the constitutionality of
the plan is to err. For example, in clarifying the differences between di-
rect subsidies and exemptions, Justice Harlan noted:
Subsidies, unlike exemptions, must be passed on periodically
and thus invite more political controversy than exemptions.
Moreover, subsidies or direct aid, as a general rule, are granted
on the basis of enumerated and more complicated qualifications
and frequently involve the state in administration to a higher
degree, though to be sure, this is not necessarily the case.
Id. at 699. The Minnesota tax credit scheme would appear to be an ex-
ception to this general rule. The frequency and directness of the rela-
tionships between the state and religion are clearly more substantial than
was necessary under the New York property tax exemption and are more
like the programs upheld in Lemon. Also relevant to this distinction is
the proposed increase in tuition by many private schools by the amount
of tax relief granted under the new law. Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 29,
1971, § E at 1, col. 1. The statutory plan is more closely aligned with the
concept of direct support since the legislative provisions do not suf-
ficiently discourage the private schools from increasing their tuition
charges in this manner.
138. See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
139. 403 U.S. 602, 623-24 (1971).
[Vol. 56:189
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL TAX CREDIT
tax credit is more akin to the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
programs than the old and established property tax at issue in
Walz. The likelihood of the ultimate extension of such a tax
credit plan, the establishment of state churches and religion,
while not subject to precise measurement is certainly predictable
enough to provide a more persuasive argument against consti-
tutionality than the universal practice of tax exemption for
church property.140 Also weighing against the Minnesota plan
is the emphasis the Court has placed on the issue of whether the
aid will benefit a broad class. Unlike the statutes at issue in
WaLz, the tax credit provisions benefit relatively few religious
faiths, and thus the fear arises that every sect or group will
make their individual demands as legislative programs in this
field are initiated or revised. Another consideration tending to
increase the likelihood of excessive intertwining of religion and
politics is the frequency with which the state must cope with
the "aid" question, due to the continuing annual applications un-
der the plan and the ease of procedure in amending these tax
credit schemes.
Permeation in the Minnesota nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary schools was seen not to be a foregone conclusion under
Chief Justice Burger's analysis so as to render the program per
se unconstitutional. 1'4  While any primary effect violation will
then turn on the evidence in each particular case, the Minnesota
legislature's attempt to remove permeation problems from any
entanglement contentions may run afoul of Chief Justice Bur-
ger's approach, since he emphasized the steps which would be
necessary to separate the secular and sectarian as well as the ad-
ministrative measures in the act. The portion of the tax plan
which directly attempts to avoid permeation issues is the provi-
sion for the determination of costs to more fully measure the ap-
propriate maximum amount allowable as a tax credit. Under
the statute, "restricted maintenance costs" is defined as 80 per
cent of the calculated maintenance costs for an individual non-
140. The one possible flaw in this contention arises from mnmm. STAT.§ 290.09(22) (1969). That section allows the taxpayer to utilize a tax de-
duction for the tuition charges and costs of transportation of a dependent
attending an elementary or secondary school. Such a provision has
existed since 1945 without being subjected to attack on First Amend-
ment grounds. Yet the statute's lack of acceptance by other states and
the lack of awareness of it on the part of Minnesota residents in light of
present church-state issues are only two of the reasons to distinguish
the statute from the tax exemption in the Walz case which had been so
generally accepted.
141. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
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public school student.142 The rationale is that nowhere in the
state do the religious costs for a child in a nonpublic school ex-
ceed 20 per cent of the total educational costs. Thus the state
will not become involved with cost allocations between religious
and secular instruction for the many students attending private
schools, yet at the same time allegedly providing no aid for re-
ligion.
Various problems are evident with this type of approach.
First, the assumption as to the 20 per cent figure may need to be
reviewed at certain intervals to assure its continued validity, and
such review would entail some small degree of entanglement.
But even if the assumption of 20 per cent proves correct, the
critical issue still remains whether this is an instance where the
type of program necessitates certain steps for implementation
that should be given priority over the actual statutory proce-
dures. Certainly there is an element of arbitrariness in the
Minnesota statute which could lead to differences in the per-
centages of relief given to various nonpublic students for secular
costs due to the variations at each private school. Also signifi-
cant is Chief Justice Burger's holding in Lemon that state in-
spection in an attempt to determine what amounts of the total
expenditures are attributable to secular education and what
amounts to religious activity is one of the most seriously dam-
aging types of involvement. 1 43 Yet the legislature's avoidance of
entanglement does not lead to a potential danger of benefits to
religion, given that the 20 per cent assumption is accurate, but
only to imprecision. This, in effect, forces the Court to go one
step further than it has before in that it now would be consider-
ing the state's attempt to prevent involvement in light of the
arbitrariness which would otherwise result. Unless this capri-
ciousness can be invalidated in itself the Court is faced with ques-
tions over the quality of legislation, something to which it is not
likely to respond.
IV. VALIDITY UNDER THE MINNESOTA
CONSTITUTION
Not only must the tax credit plan confront substantial ob-
stacles at the federal level, but it must also satisfy the appropri-
ate Minnesota constitutional provisions1 4 4 which are much more
specific than the clauses in the First Amendment to the United
142. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(1) (1971).
143. 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
144. MINN. CONST. art. 8, § 2; art. 1, § 16; art. 4, § 33; art. 9, § 1.
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States Constitution. While it is true that these more specific pro-
visions do not deny validity to every assistance program'" and
that statutes will be held unconstitutional only when invalid
beyond a reasonable doubt,14 one cannot ignore the Minnesota
Supreme Court's conclusion that the state restrictions are much
more stringent than the federal limitations.14 7
A. M]=. CONST. ART. 8, § 2
Perhaps the most demanding of the pertinent state constitu-
tional provisions is Minn. Const. art. 8, § 2:
The legislature shall make provisions, by taxation or otherwise,
as, with the income arising from the school fund, will secure a
thorough and efficient system of public schools in each township
in the State. But in no case shall the moneys derived as afore-
said, or any portion thereof, or any public money or property,
be appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein the
distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular Christian
or other religious sects are promulgated or taught.
1. Minnesota Decisions
The only meaningful interpretation of this provision is found
in the recent case of Americans United, Inc. v. Independent
School District No. 622.148 There the state supreme court up-
held an authorization by a school board to provide transporta-
tion for children attending sectarian schools issued pursuant to
the appropriate bussing statute. While not expressly adopting
the child benefit theory, inferences from the court's opinion lead
to the conclusion that the doctrine was accepted as relevant,
though limited. Such thinking possibly became the central the-
oretical basis for the passage of the tax credit provisions. Yet
one cannot refuse to consider the extensive dicta in the court's
decision. Language expressing concern over support directly
connected with the educational process, and thus not sustainable
as safety or welfare legislation, is prevalent throughout the opin-
ion. Support of parochial schools was considered indistinguish-
able from support of religion.1 49 The wide latitude given these
private schools in their various functions was said correspond-
ingly to require taxpayers and the state to be free from support-
145. Americans United, Inc. v. Independent School Dist., 288 Minn.
196, 179 N.W.2d 146 (1970).
146. Id. at 204, 179 N.W.2d at 151.
147. Id. at 213, 179 N.W.2d at 155.
148. 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d 146 (1970).
149. Id. at 215, 179 N.W.2d at 156.
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ing the instructional aspects of these institutions.' 1 Concern for
the continued existence of sectarian schools if not assisted by
public funds was felt to be misplaced. Such economic arguments
would better be directed at the need for a constitutional amend-
ment.151
2. Opinions of Other State Courts
a. Bussing Cases
The Americans United opinion does not seem unreasonable
in light of the considerations mentioned in Everson v. Board
of Education. Yet the invalidation of similar transportation pro-
grams by courts in many other jurisdictions exemplifies the more
rigid position often taken at the state level.152 However, this is
not to imply that the Americans United decision stands by it-
self.' 53 Those state courts that have faced the issue of the con-
stitutionality of such bussing statutes are sharply divided.
Although peculiarities in the various states' constitutional
provisions or legislative histories'54 leave any comparative analy-
sis of limited usefulness, certain identifiable approaches weave
through many of the opinions. The expenditures of public funds
for transportation of students to nonpublic schools has been jus-
tified by viewing the program as simply general welfare legis-
lation'5 5 or by employing the child benefit theory in finding that
the direct support is to the student and the benefits to the
church related school are inconsequential or incidental. 5 0 Other
courts have felt that the fact cannot be ignored that the educa-
tional institutions are relieved of the expense of bringing the
child to school. 157 Another factor emphasized in rejecting the
150. Id. at 217, 179 N.W.2d at 157.
151. Id.
152. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961); Snyder v.
Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960); Opinion of the
Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966); Spears v. Honda, 51 Hawaii 1, 449
P.2d 130 (1968); Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860 (Idaho 1971); Board of
Ed. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963); Visser v. Nooksack Valley
School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
153. Alexander v. Bartlett, 14 Mich. App. 177, 165 N.W.2d 445
(1968); Honohan v. Holt, 17 Ohio Misc. 57, 244 N.E.2d 537 (1968); Rhodes
v. School Dist., 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53 (1967).
154. See Spears v. Honda, 51 Hawaii 1, 449 P.2d 130 (1968).
155. Honohan v. Holt, 17 Ohio Misc. 57, 69, 244 N.E.2d 537, 545 (1968).
156. Rhodes v. School Dist., 424 Pa. 202, 220, 226 A.2d 53, 64 (1967).
157. Board of Ed. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 914 (Okla. 1963); Visser v.
Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 669, 709, 207 P.2d 198, 203-04
(1949); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 156-57, 115
N.W.2d 761, 765 (1962).
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bussing laws has been that transportation programs are more
easily identifiable as an element essential to the parochial schools
than, for example, police or fire protection2Y' A theory which
has met with even less success is that the costs incurred by the
state are not more than would exist if these students were at-
tending public schools. Such an argument recognizes no limits
in application. 59 Equally unsuccessful has been the argument
that the legislation is merely a legitimate exercise of the police
power. This idea only begs the question since constitutionality
must invariable circumscribe its scope.10
Provisions as specific in nature as the Minnesota constitu-
tion's article 8, section 2 have been interpreted in other states.
In Spears v. Honda the Hawaii Supreme Court, in construing the
constitutional prohibition against public funds being "appropri-
ated for the support or benefit of any sectarian or private edu-
cational institution,"' 61 rejected the child benefit theory and
found "support" in the increase in enrollment and tendency for
the bussing statute to help develop, strengthen and make success-
ful the nonpublic schools.0 2 The same rationale has been applied
by the Delaware Supreme Court'0 3 based on a provision of that
state's constitution which denies the use of educational funds "by
or in aid of any sectarian, church or denominational school."' 04
However, article 4, section 30 of the California constitution,
which prohibits legislative attempts to "help to support or sus-
tain any school, college, university, hospital, or other institution
controlled by any religious creed, church, or sectarian denomi-
nation whatever" was held by the California Supreme Court in
Bowker v. Baker 65 to be distinguishable from constitutional pro-
visions denying both direct and indirect aid to denominational
schools, in that the former might allow for incidental and im-
material benefits.
158. Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668, 670 (Del. 1966); Visser v.
Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 669, 708, 207 P.2d 198, 203
(1949); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 157-59, 115
N.W.2d 761, 765-67 (1962).
159. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 160, 115
N.W.2d 761, 767 (1962).
160. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 944 (Alaska 1961); Visser v.
Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 669, 710, 207 P.2d 198, 204
(1949).
161. HAWAI CONST. art. 9, § 1.
162. 51 Hawaii at 12-13, 449 P.2d at 137.
163. Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966).
164. DL. CONST. art. 10, § 3.
165. 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946).
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b. Textbook Cases
Variations also existed in determinations of the acceptability
of statutory plans which permit the state to provide textbooks
to students in both public and nonpublic schools. In Dickmann
v. School District'6 6 the Oregon "free textbook" statute was said
to violate the constitutional prohibition against the use of public
moneys "for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or theological
institution."'0 7  While admitting that all benefits conferred
upon parochial schools are not disallowable, 16 both the child
benefit theory and the value received doctrine' 69 were rejected
as impliedly recognizing no limitations in application. 170 Instead
the proper analysis was the functions rather than the institu-
tions aided. In so doing the Oregon Supreme Court saw the text-
book provisions to be more directly related to educational in-
struction permeated by religion rather than general welfare al-
lowances such as school transportation laws.17 1
However, opposite conclusions have been reached in many
other states which are often difficult to reconcile. For example,
although the relevant section of the New Hampshire constitu-
tion states that "no money raised by taxation shall ever be
granted or applied for the use of the schools or institutions of
any religious sect or denomination, '"1 72 the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court viewed a similar textbook statute as merely an at-
tempt to fulfill a public purpose since presumably only books
used for secular subjects were included in the plan.1 7 3 If ade-
quate limitations were placed on the program to assure that no
greater or more direct benefits would be given a religious sect,
the court then could not allow itself to deny assistance because
of the student's particular religious beliefs.174  The New York
statute at issue in Allen was also found to not violate state con-
stitutional proscriptions. The New York constitution provided
166. 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961).
167. OR&. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
168. 232 Ore. at 247, 366 P.2d at 538.
169. According to this latter concept, largely discarded today, when
a religious institution performs a task which the state itself would other-
wise have to fulfill, payments to that organization are not in support of
it, but merely remuneration for services rendered. See generally Cush-
man, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional
Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 336, 336-37 (1950).
170. 232 Ore. at 250-55, 366 P.2d at 539-42.
171. Id. at 255-57, 366 P.2d at 542-43.
172. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83.
173. Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 258 A.2d 343 (1969).
174. Id. at 581-83, 258 A.2d at 346-47.
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that public moneys could not be "used, directly or indirectly, in
aid or maintenance ... of any school or institution of learning
wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious
denomination."' 7 5 In overruling Judd v. Board of Education,'"0
the-leading expression of the child benefit theory, the court held
"directly or indirectly" to refer to the "means of attaining the
prohibited end of aid to religion as such."17 7 Thus the legislation
was considered only an attempt to improve the quality of learn-
ing in the state, and the collateral benefit to parochial schools
was seen as inconsequential in light of the educational lag that
would otherwise result.'7 8  The Louisiana Supreme Court in
Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education'" held that state's
textbook law to be constitutional in spite of comprehensive and
exacting constitutional provisions. While no appropriations
could be made of public funds to support "any private or sec-
tarian school"' 8 0 the court nevertheless upheld the program as
a permissible exercise of the state's police power in the promo-
tion of education and the furtherance of the general welfare.'8 '
The parochial schools were deemed to not be the real beneficiar-
ies at all since they obtained nothing directly and were not re-
lieved of any obligations.18 2 Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme
Court approved a textbook loan system as not in violation of
constitutional limitations against appropriations "for the support
of any sectarian school' 83
c. Tuition and Other Educational Expenses
The early judicial applications of state constitutional provi-
sions to statutory allowances for tuition and other related costs
arose in the context of state contracts with religious institutions
for care of wards of the state. The Nevada Supreme Court
viewed such arrangements as inconsistent with the state's consti-
tutional prohibitions against public funds being used "for sec-
tarian purposes."' 84 The daily religious activities, although brief
175. N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
176. 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
177. Board of Ed. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 115-16, 228 N.E.2d 791, 794,
281 N.Y.S.2d 779, 803-04 (1967).
178. Id. at 116-17, 228 N.E.2d at 794, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 804-05.
179. 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
180. LA. CONsT. art. 12, § 13.
181. 168 La. at 1021-22, 123 So. at 661.
182. Id. at 1020, 123 So. at 660-61.
183. Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd.,
190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941) (construing Miss. CoNsT. art. 8, § 208).
184. State v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882) (interpreting NEV. CONST.
art. 11, § 10).
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in duration, could not be considered as having no effect upon the
impressionable minds of the children. 185 However, in Dunn v.
Chicago Industrial School for Girls's8 similar contracts were up-
held even though the Illinois constitution stated that it is im-
proper for a public body ever to "make any appropriation or pay
from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or
sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school con-
trolled by any church or sectarian denomination."'18 7 As justifi-
cation for such a result the court noted that it would be con-
trary to fact and reason to say that the state's contribution of
an amount less than the actual cost of all nonreligious materials
furnished could possibly aid the religious functions of an insti-
tution.1 8 Also, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has rejected
a constitutional attack on the payment of public funds for the
support, care and maintenance of delinquent, neglected or de-
pendent children placed in sectarian homes and institutions.' 8
Even though appropriations were forbidden for "charitable, edu-
cational or benevolent purposes . .. to any denominational or
sectarian institution."'10 0 The program was accepted under the
child benefit theory. Likewise, in Murrow Indian Orphans Home
v. Childers'"' the provision against the use of public money "di-
rectly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other re-
ligious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such'" 2
was held not to condemn the state's contracts for care of de-
pendent children. The state was merely rendering a service in
fulfillment of its duty to care for these needy children. ' 9,1
Many other jurisdictions have rejected the various ap-
proaches used in these ward cases and have held unconstitutional
programs aiding nonpublic schools through direct payments of
tuition or other educational costs which are regarded as the "life
blood" of these institutions.' 9 4  The South Dakota Supreme
185. Id. at 386.
186. 280 Ill. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917).
187. ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 3. This provision is now ILL. CONST. art. 10,
§ 3.
188. 280 Ill. at 618, 117 N.E. at 737.
189. Schade v. Allegheny County Inst. Dept., 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d
911 (1956).
190. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 18.
191. 197 Okla. 249, 171 P.2d 600 (1946).
192. OKLA. CONsT. art. 2, § 5.
193. 197 Okla. at 250, 171 P.2d at 603.
194. But see State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d
256 (1940) (discussed in text accompanying notes 228-29 infra, interpret-
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Court has construed those portions of its constitution providing
that "[n]o money or property of the state shall be given or ap-
propriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or
institution' ' 95 and that "[n] o appropriation of lands, money, or
other property or credits to aid any sectarian school shall ever
be made by the state"'196 to disallow a program whereby the
parochial schools would receive tuition payments by the public
board of education. 197 This constitutional provision was held to
prohibit in every form, whether as a gift or otherwise, payments
which support and strengthen the institution, regardless of
whether the payments are in consideration for services rend-
ered. 9 8 In Otken v. Lamkin'09 the constitution declaration
that "[n]o religious sect or sects shall ever control any part of
the school or university funds of this State"200 required the
Mississippi Supreme Court to hold invalid a statutory plan al-
lowing the state to make available to pro rata share of a school
fund to cover educational costs of each child, regardless of the
school which the student elected to attend. In Almond v. Day
2 0
'
the Virginia Supreme Court rejected the child benefit theory
concluding that an allowance for tuition costs to orphans of
veterans at whatever school attended was forbidden by consti-
tutional denial of any appropriation of public funds "to any
school or institution of learning not owned or controlled by the
State. ' 202 The Missouri Supreme Court, in the case of Berghorn
v. Reorganized School District,20 3 found the expenditures of pub-
lic funds for the support of parochial schools to be inconsistent
with the constitutional prohibitions against funds being used
"to help to support or sustain any private or public school, acad-
emy, seminary, college, university or other institution of learn-
ing controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian de-
nomination."2 04 In State v. Taylor20 5 efforts by the public boards
ing IwD. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6 & 4); Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky.
1956) (text accompanying notes 230-32 infra, interpreting Ky. CONST. §§
5 & 189); Afillard v. Board of Ed., 121 Ill. 297, 10 N.E. 669 (1887); State
ex rel. Attwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 251, 176 N.W. 224 (1920).
195. SD. CONST. art. 6, § 3.
196. S.D. CoNsT. art. 8, § 16.
197. Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891).
198. Id. at 373-74, 50 N.W. at 635.
199. 56 Miss. 758 (1879).
200. Miss. CoNsT. art. 8, § 9. This provision is now Miss. CONST.
art. 8, § 208.
201. 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
202. VA. CONST. § 141.
203. 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573 (1953).
204. Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 8.
205. 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932).
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of education to rent rooms in the parochial schools and employ
nuns to instruct the students were held impermissible under a
constitutional prohibition against sectarian instruction being al-
lowed in an "institution supported in whole or in part by the
public funds set apart for educational purposes. '2 0 0
More recent legislation attempting to provide for the pur-
chase of secular services has met similar results.20 7 In light of
the role to be played by parochial schools, it has been said to
be perhaps impossible to determine where the secular purpose
ends and the sectarian begins. 20 8 The justification of a purchase
of secular services as a legitimate public response to the eco-
nomic crisis being faced by parochial schools has been rejected
when encroachments of this type result. 20 9 The degree of en-
tanglement necessary to assure secularity is said to increase to an
improper extent.210  The possible closing of schools which re-
sults from such decisions denying the granting of aid is consid-
ered not to be irrational in terms of damaging the desired di-
versity of educational systems because an opposite decision
would create the same problem to the extent that coercive ele-
ments are imposed by the public school system as conditions or
incidents of providing the aid.2 11
B. MnN. CONST. ART. 1, § 16
Article 1, section 16 of the Minnesota constitution, a provi-
sion associated more generally with religion than article 8, sec-
tion 2, provides in relevant part:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dic-
tates of his own conscience shall never be infringed, nor shall
any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of
worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry,
against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with
206. NEB. CONST. art. 7, § 11.
207. Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970); Opinion of
the Justices, 258 N.E.2d 779 (Mass. 1970); In re Proposal C, 384 Mich. 390,
185 N.W. 9 (1971); State ex Tel. Chambers v. School Dist., 155 Mont.
422, 472 P.2d 1013 (1970).
208. State ex tel. Chambers v. School Dist., 155 Mont. 422, 438, 472
P.2d 1013, 1021 (1970) (applying MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 8, which for-
bids a public body from attempting to make "directly or indirectly, any
appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys whatever, or make
any grant of lands or other property in aid of any church, or for any sec-
tarian purpose or for any school . . . controlled in whole or in part by
any church, sect or denomination whatever.")
209. Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 1059-60, 241 So. 2d 213, 220
(1970).
210. Id. at 1058, 241 So. 2d at 220.
211. Id. at 1067, 241 So. 2d at 223.
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the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given
by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so con-
strued as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices in-
consistent with the peace or safety of the State, nor shall any
money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any reli-
gious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.
This section is much like the establishment clause and free ex-
ercise clause of the First Amendment, and the last clause of this
provision is similar to the prohibition against the expenditure of
public funds set forth in article 8, section 2.212
1. Minnesota Decisions
The few cases in which the court has had an opportunity to
apply this constitutional provision have usually not concerned
school aid.213 The one exception is Americans United, Inc. v. In-
dependent School District No. 622,214 although its usefulness for
analysis is limited by the summary fashion in which the court
dealt with this section. The conclusion that the bussing statute
"does not exceed the boundary of what is permissible under
Minn. Const. art 1, § 16; art. 4, § 33; art. 8, § 2; or art. 9, § 112 15
resulted from an analysis of only article 8, section 2, considered
the most stringent of the applicable provisions..2 1 0
2. Other State Jurisdictions
a. Transportation Programs
In Honohan v. Holt217 the Ohio bussing statute withstood a
212. Many of the cases in the text accompanying notes 154-212, su-
pra, also gave consideration to constitutional clauses similar to that con-
tained in the last part of MmN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 16. See, e.g., LA.
CONST. art. 4, § 8 as interpreted in Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241
So. 2d 213 (1970); MAss. CONST. art. 46, § 2 as interpreted in Opinion of
the Justices, 258 N.E.2d 779 (Mass. 1970); Mo. CoNsT. art. 6, § 3 as in-
terpreted in Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 364 Mo. 121, 260
S.W.2d 573 (1932); N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, art. 83 as interpreted in Opinion of
the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 258 A.2d 343 (1969); OKLA. CONsT. art. 2, § 5
as interpreted in Murrow Indian Orphans Home v. Childers, 197 Okla.
249, 171 P.2d 600 (1946) ; ORE. CoNST. art. 1, § 5 as interpreted in Dickman
v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961); PA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 18
as interpreted in Schade v. Allegheny County Inst. Dept., 386 Pa. 507,
136 A.2d 911 (1956);S.D. CONsT. art. 6, § 3 as interpreted in Synod of Da-
kota v. State, 2 S.D. 336, 50 N.W. 632 (1891).
213. See State v. Olson, 287 Minn. 300, 178 N.W.2d 230 (1970); In re
Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
214. 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d 146 (1970).
215. 288 Minn. 196, 217, 179 N.W.2d 146, 157 (1970).
216. Id. at 201, 179 N.W.2d at 149.
217. 17 Ohio Misc. 57, 244 N.E.2d 537 (1968).
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challenge based on the constitutional prohibition against being
"compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship. '2 18
Assuming a school to be a "place of worship," the court never-
theless concluded that the indirect benefits resulting to the
school from bus transportation are not "support" within the
purview of this constitutional provision. 219 The Connecticut Su-
preme Court reached the same result in construing a constitu-
tional prohibition against any person being "compelled to join or
support. . any congregation, church or religious association. ' 2 0
The word "support" was deemed never to have been intended to
prevent every sort of incidental public assistance to, and encour-
agement of, religious activity. 22 ' But in State v. Nusbaum222 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a different interpretation of its
constitutional provision:
nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his con-
sent; nor shall any control of, or interference be given by the
law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor
shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of
religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries. 223
Primary and secondary schools were determined to be religious
societies or seminaries and impermissible benefits were received
by these organizations through cost savings and increases in
enrollment.224
b. Textbooks
The Louisiana constitution, being similar to the First
Amendment in that it denies the passage of any law "respecting
an establishment of religion, ' 225 has been interpreted to permit
the implementation of a textbook program in a case in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court viewed the students as the sole bene-
ficiaries of such a statute.226 In Bowerman v. O'Connor22 7 the
Rhode Island Supreme Court declared its constitutional require-
ment that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or to support
218. OHIO CONST. art. 8, § 3.
219. 17 Ohio Misc. at 67, 244 N.E.2d at 544.
220. Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770(1960) (construing CONN. CONST. art. 7).
221. Id. at 386-87, 161 A.2d at 777.
222. 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
223. WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
224. 17 Wis. 2d at 156-58, 115 N.W.2d at 765-66.
225. LA. CONsT. art. 1, § 4.
226. Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 168 La. 1005, 1020, 123
So. 665, 660-61 (1929).
227. 104 R.I. 519, 247 A.2d 82 (1968).
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any religious worship, place or ministry whatever" 228 to be no
more restrictive than the First Amendment as interpreted in
Board of Education v. Allen. Therefore a textbook program was
held not to violate the state constitution.
c. Tuition and Other Related Costs
In Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls22 the Su-
preme Court of Illinois found contracts whereby the state paid a
religious institution for the care of girls committed thereto by
the juvenile court not to be in violation of the constitutional pro-
vision which states that "no person shall be required to attend or
support any ministry or place of worship against his consent nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomina-
tions or mode of worship. '23 0 In State ex rel. Boyd v. Johnson2 31
the Indiana Supreme Court held that the clause providing that
"no preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious so-
ciety, or mode of worship; and no man shall be compelled to at-
tend, erect, or support, any place of worship" -3 2 did not mean
the school board could not assist the financially depressed paro-
chial schools by employing certain nuns to instruct the stu-
dents, in only secular courses. In Rawlings v. Butler2 33 the statu-
tory allowance of public funds to teachers who were members of
a religious organization and rent school buildings from the
church was determined not to violate section 5 of the Kentucky
constitution, which states that "no preference shall ever be given
by law to any religious sect, society, or denominaton ... nor shall
any person be compelled to attend any place of worship, to con-
tribute to the erection or maintenance of any such place, or to
the salary or support of any minister of religion." The teachers
were said not to be teaching religion in the schools, their religious
views and mode of dress being their personal affair.23 4 No con-
stitutional objection could be seen to the renting of the buildings
from the Roman Catholic Church since the church in no manner
attempted to influence or control the conduct of the schools. 2 3
However in Seegers v. Parker 36 the Louisiana Supreme Court
228. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
229. 280 Il. 613,117 N.E. 735 (1917).
230. ILT. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
231. 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940).
232. IND. CONsT. art. 1, § 4.
233. 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956).
234. Id. at 804.
235. Id. at 806.
236. 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970).
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declared invalid a purchase of secular services under the consti-
tutional section which states that "no law shall be passed re-
specting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; nor shall any preference be given, nor any dis-
crimination made against, any church, sect, or creed or reli-
gion. '237 The court rejected the contention that the conduit for
the aid is the appropriate test, instead finding unconstitutionality
to be the result of excessive entanglement. 238 Similarly, in Al-
mond v. Day2 3 9 a statutory provision for tuition payments of or-
phans of veterans at any educational institution was held to vio-
late the constitutional clause that "no man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry,
whatsoever. '240  Also deemed inconsistent were the Missouri
constitutional provision that "no person shall be compelled to
erect, support or attend any place or system of worship ' 24 I and
the statutory grant of payments to maintain parochial schools
in the state.242
C. MxN. CONST. ART. 4, § 33 AND ART. 9, § 1
Article 4, section 33 of the Minnesota constitution provides,
in part, that the legislature cannot enact local or special laws
"authorizing public taxation for a private purpose." Along simi-
lar lines, article 9, section 1 states that "taxes shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects, and shall be levied and collected
for public purposes. '243
237. LA. CONsT. art. 1, § 4.
238. 256 La. at 1057-58, 241 So. 2d at 219-20.
239. 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
240. VA. CONST. § 58.
241. MO. CONsT. art. 1, § 10.
242. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d
573 (1953).
243. Actually this constitutional provision is broader than MINN.
CONST. art. 4, § 33 in that there is the additional requirement of uniform-
ity of taxation. The standard of protection afforded by this test is similar
to that provided by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 261, 253 N.W. 102, 106 (1934).
The demand is for substantial equality so that persons and property simi-
larly situated are treated approximately the same. Anderson v. Com-
missioner of Taxation, 253 Minn. 528, 540-41, 93 N.W.2d 523, 533 (1958).
The problem is thus one of classification with the legislature having wide
discretion. Ability to pay and extent of protection or benefit are often
considered to be an appropriate justification for various classes. Reed
v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 266, 253 N.W. 102, 108 (1934). The difference
here between the tax charged to nonpublic school parents and the
amount owed by public school parents must be more generally based on
some ground which is reasonable, not arbitrary, and which has a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation. In re Taxes on Real
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While the Minnesota Supreme Court has considered "public
purpose" issues to be resolved necessarily on an individual case
basis, 244 certain guidelines have been set forth which assist in an
evaluation of the contention that the tax credit plan constitutes
an expenditure of public funds for a private purpose. "Public
purpose" is construed to mean "such an activity as will serve as
a benefit to the community as a body and which, at the same
time, is directly related to the functions of government.124 5 The
public nature is deemed not to be destroyed by incidental aid to
private institutions if the primary purpose of the legislation was
to provide public aid.246
The policy of the state has been to favor the establishment of
private educational institutions.247 In determining qualifications
for tax exemption under article 9, section 1 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has also demanded evidence of the accomplishment
of public purposes and has elaborated upon the requirements
for meeting this test in the area of education.2 48 It is imperative
that the institution be a reasonable substitute for a public school
in offering comparable subjects which are taught in such a man-
ner as to allow a student to change school systems without
losing any credit for courses taken.-4
D. EVALUATION UNDER MuNNESOTA CoNsTrTUTIoNAL PROVISIONS
Many of the state courts have interpreted their state consti-
tutional provisions to allow indirect or incidental aid. The tax
credit plan attempts to reach this result in two ways. By grant-
ing aid to the parents rather than the school itself the legislature
Estate, 271 imi. 460, 465-66, 136 N.W.2d 782, 786 (1965). Any justifica-
tion for the distinction then, such as the fact that a parochial school
parent is having to otherwise pay for the costs in both private and public
educational systems, must not only pass challenges under the religion
clauses but also attacks rooted in alleged unreasonableness.
244. Arguably a tax credit is not even covered by MINN. CONST.
art. 4, § 33 or art. 9, § 1, since it is not "public taxation" which is "levied
and collected." But the public purpose doctrine has been given wide ap-
plication to cover expenditures, Port Authority v. Fisher, 269 Minn. 276,
294, 132 N.W.2d 183, 195-96 (1964), and in one state exemptions have even
been labelled as equivalent to expenditures. Snyder v. Town of New-
town, 147 Conn. 374, 386, 161 A-2d 770, 776 (1960).
245. Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (1958).
246. Burns v. Essling, 156 Minn. 171, 174, 194 N.W. 404, 405 (1923).
This is somewhat similar to the federal test enunciated in Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962).
247. State v. Northwestern Prep. School, 249 Minn. 552, 557, 83
N.W.2d 242, 246 (1957).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 557-59, 83 N.W.2d at 246-47.
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attempted to avoid any direct relationships with religious in-
stitutions and any possible "support" of religion. Also, the lan-
guage used in Walz was utilized to show indirectness in the re-
fraining from tax collection as opposed to direct payments.2 1"
While it is true that the Americans United decision implied that
the child benefit theory might be accepted as a rational test it
cannot be ignored that the tax credit is associated with the heart
of educational instruction, an area into which the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has suggested that a statutory program cannot con-
stitutionally venture. The more recent decisions from various
other state courts which have interpreted constitutional provi-
sions similar to article 8, section 2 and article 1, section 16 also
generally reject any benefits directly related to tuition and teach-
ers' salaries, although textbook allowances usually are ap-
proved. The older ward cases allowing state aid on the basis
of such theories as the value received doctrine, while not to be
ignored completely, must be discounted in light of the influential
subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions. As for "pub-
lic purpose" contentions under article 4, section 33 and article 9,
section 1, arguably the parochial schools serve to benefit the
community by providing educational opportunities, while at the
same time relieving the state of some of its educational burden.
As was stated in Everson: "It is much too late to argue that
legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to
get a secular education serves no public purpose. ' '2 ' But the
private gains received by the parochial schools, which must be
recognized as a consequence of the Minnesota Supreme Court's
tendency to see permeation as inevitable, should not be ignored
unless such benefits can be labeled incidental. Also, it is possi-
ble to argue that the student's choice of another educational
system was a voluntary one, and the direct educational costs are
for him to assume. 2
5 2
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the Minnesota tax credit plan is a
grave question. This is true to an even greater extent under the
Minnesota constitution than under the United States Constitu-
tion since this state, like many others, has attempted to formu-
late standards more rigorous than exist at the federal level.
Both the technical means of implementing the program and
250. But see note 137 supra.
251. 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
252. Board of Ed. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 913 (Okla. 1963).
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the program itself are subject to constitutional attack. The tend-
ency of the Supreme Court and the state courts has been to
realize the growing economic crisis which revolves around the
school systems and yet to be hesitant in responding with aid of
even minor proportions when dangerous church-state interre-
lationships exist. It is more likely than not that the Minnesota
tax credit scheme will eventually be held unconstitutional

